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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BOISE-PAYETTE LUMBER
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

)
f

PHOENIX INDEMNITY COMpANY, a corporation, BYRON J.
DARLEY and BONNIE H. DARLEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 8115

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the month of August, 1951, Byron J. Darley, the
owner of Lot 217, l\iorningside Heights, Salt Lake
County, Utah, entered into a contract with one Stanley
H. Pickles for the erection of a residence on said real
estate. The contract called for Mr. Pickles to build a
house in accordance with eertain plans and specifications and required Mr. Darley to pay the contractor,
~Jr. Pickles, the sum of $13,700.00 (R. 11, 12).
The contract agreement specifies that the contractor
shall ''save the Owner harmless from any liens or claims
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

arising out of the work herein agreed to be performed.''
(R. 15, Line 11). On the 20th day of September, 1951,
Phoenix Indemnity Company entered into an agreement
wherein they, as surety for Stanley H. Pickles, the contractor, agreed to ''indemnify the Owner against any
and all loss or damage directly arising by reason of the
failure of the principal to faithfully perform said contract.'' (R. 10, Line 21).
Boise-Payette Lumber Company furnished lumber
and building materials for use in and about the construction of the improvement on the premises of Byron J.
Darley, of a total value of $968.61 for which they were
not paid (R. 2, Line 8).
Under the provisions of Section 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953),
the materialman, Boise-Payette Lumber Company, instituted an action against Byron J. and Bonnie H. Darley
demanding the amount due to the materialman for materials furnished for the improvement of their premises.
After the answer to the complaint had been filed
by the owners, Byron J. and Bonnie H. Darley, their
counsel entered a motion for judgment-no cause of
action (R. 20), and after argument duly had, the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted the
owners' motion for judgment-no cause of action, on the
basis that they had complied with the provisions of Section 14-2-1, U.C.A. (1953).
(For emphasis, the Appellant has italicized portions
of documents and authorities quoted in its brief.)
2
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
The court erred in granting the defendants' and
respondents' motion for summary judgment-no cause
of action, in that:
I. THE BOND FURNISHED, WHEN CONSIDERED ALONE, DOES NOT C011:PLY WITH THE
REQUIRE:I\IENTS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 2, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (1953).
II. THE BOND FURNISHED, WHEN CONSTRUED TOGETHER AND IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OWNERS AND
THE CONTRACTOR, DOES NOT COl\iPLY WITH
OR MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 14,
CHAPTER 2, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (1953).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE BOND FURNISHED, WHEN CONSIDERED
ALONE, DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREI\TENTS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 2, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (1953).
The statutes of the State of Utah under which this
suit is instituted are Sections 14-2-1, 2, U.C.A. (1953)
which provide as follows :
'' 14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.- The owner of any interest in land
3
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entering into a contract, involving $500 or more,
for t~e construction, addition to, or alteration or
repau of, any building, structure or improvement
upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a
sum equal to the contract price, with good and
sufficient securities, conditioned for the faithful
performance of the contract and prompt payment
for material furnished and labor performed under
the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner
and to all other persons as their interest may
appear; and any person who has furnished materials or performed labor for or upon such building, structure or improvement, payment for which
has not been made, shall have a direct right of
action against the sureties upon such bond for the
reasonable value of the materials furnished or
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any
case the prices agreed upon; which right of action
shall accrue forty days after the completion, or
abandonment, or default in the performance, of
the work provided for in the contract.
''The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request."
The bond in this cause is conditioned as follows:
''NOW, THEREFORE, THE CONDITION
OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH, That if the
Principal shall indemnify the Owners against any
and all loss or damage directly arising by reason
of the failure of the Principal to faithfully perform said contract, then this obligation shall be
void ; otherwise to remain in full force and effect.''
(R. 10, Lines 20 to 24 inclusive.)
and runs to the benefit of the owners as follows :
4
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'' . . . Phoenix Indemnity Company . . . as
surety are held and firmly bound unto Byron. J.
Darley and Bonnie H. Darley of. Salt ~ake C1ty,
Utah . . . " ( R. 10, Lines 5 to 9 1nclus1 ve.)
The bond furnished does not run ''. . . to all other
persons as their interest may appear; and any person
who is furnished materials or performed labor for or
upon such building ... '' nor is it '' ... conditioned for
... prompt payment for materials furnished . . . " as
required by the statute from which the above quoted
portions are extracted. Consequently, in order for the
bond to qualify under the statute, some document other
than the bond must be considered and construed with
the bond in order for it to attain the standards set forth
in the statute above cited, which relieve the owners from
direct liability for payment of amounts due laborers and
materialmen for work and materials furnished to the
improvement of the premises of the owners.
In the event a proper bond is not obtained, the
owners are directly liable to the laborers and materialmen under the provisions of Section 14-2-2, U.C.A. (1953)
as follows:
H Failure to require bond-Direct liability.Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all persons
who have furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed
upon.''

5
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POINT II.
THE BOND FURNISHED, WHEN CONSTRUED
TOGETHER AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OWNERS AND THE
CONTRACTOR, DOES NOT COMPLY WITH OR
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 2, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
(1953).
As indicated above, the bond purchased by the
owners does not by itself meet the conditions and requirements of the Utah Code with sufficient particularity
to relieve the owners from direct liability for labor and
materials furnished in the construction of an improvement on the property of the owners. The bond and the
contract involved in this action, when considered as a
whole and construed together, constitute only an agreement to save harmless or indemnify. The courts of this
jurisdiction and other jurisdictions have consistently
held that unless the documents contain an absolute
promise to pay laborers and materialmen, the owners
are not relieved from direct liability to them. 77 A.L.R.
64; 118 A.L.R. 66; De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, et al.,
116 Utah 144, 208 P. 2d 1127.
In the great majority of cases involving statutes
requiring bonds for private contractors, the courts, in
a just application of the principles of equity, have uniformly held that where the requirements of the statute
are fairly and substantially met by the contract and the

6
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bond guaranteeing performance of the contract, the
owner would be relieved of the statutory liability for
direct payment of labor and material. This line of
authority seems proper, for though the documents may
not technically comply with the statutes, substantial
compliance is obtained and the comparative rights of the
parties involved are maintained.
However, the case at bar does not fall within the
rule above cited, for in the cause at issue neither the
bond nor the contract run to the benefit of, or require
payment of laborers and materialmen. The instruments
purport only to indemnify the owners against the claims
of laborers and materialmen, and as a result, the laborer
or materialman has no right of action against the bonding company, whose duty to pay does not arise until the
owners have suffered damage. Further, the owners
cannot demand that the contractor pay laborers, for no
liability as between the owners and contractor arises
under the terms of the contract until such time as the
owners have been damaged, at which time the contractor
must save the owners harmless or indemnify the loss.
Without question, it was the intention of the Legislature
to afford laborers and materialmen a direct right of
action against a substantial solvent surety, or afford
them a right to institute a suit directly against the
owners of the property.
An owner upon instituting a plan for the construction of an improvement of his premises is faced with
two alternatives as follows:

7
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\

1. He may require the contractor to purchase and
furnish a bond, running to the benefit of laborers and
materialmen, wherein the sureties agree that they will
pay to laborers and materialmen the reasonable value
of the labor and material furnished; or,
2. He may waive the requirement of the bond in
which event he, as owner, is personally liable for the
reasonable value of the labor and material furnished in
the construction of the improvement.
In the case at bar, the owners required that the contractor enter into an agreement with the owners wherein
the contractor agreed: " ... to save the Owner harmless
from any lien or claim arising out of work herein agreed
to be performed." (R. 15, Lines 11-13, inclusive), and,
thereafter the contractor at his own instance, or at the
request of the owners, furnished the owners with a bond
in the penal amount of the contract, wherein the bonding company and the contractor jointly agreed to
''. . . indemnify the owner against any and all loss or
damage ... " (R. 10, Line 21). By choice, the owners
clearly assumed direct liability for payment of laborers
and materialmen.
The construction of bonds and contracts of the types
herein considered, as far as counsel has been able to
determine, has been almost completely uniform. The
courts in all jurisdictions, in essence, holding that if the
bond or contract require payment of laborers and
materialmen, the spirit of the statute had been complied

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with and the owners were relieved of liability; but where
the contract and bond agree only to save the owner
harmless and indemnify him from loss, the requirements
of the statutes have not been fairly and adequately met,
and the owners are personally liable under the statutes
to the laborers and materialmen. As direct authority
for the principles above set forth, see 9 American Jurisprudence-Building and Construction Contracts, which
states, beginning on page 61:
'' §95. Right of Persons Furnishing M a.terial
or Labor to sue on Contractor's Bond to Owner.
"§97. -As Dependent Upon Terms or Condition of Bond.- ... The weight of authority, and
certainly the view more in keeping with the spirit
of modern jurisprudence, sustains the right of a
person furnishing labor or materials to recover
on a private building contractor's bond naming
the owner of the property as obligee, conditioned
that the contractor shall pay all claims for labor
and materials or that he shall pay laborers and
materialmen12 as well as on a bond conditioned
merely upon the faithful performance of the contract, and containing no express and direct provision for their payment where the contract expressly required the contractor to pay such persons or to satisfy all claims for labor and materials. 13 • • • ' '
" ... On the other hand, it has been held that
laborers or materialmen have no right to recover
on a bond conditioned merely for the application
of the money received under the contract in payment for materials and labor, 18 to furnish labor
and materials/ 9 for the faithful performance of
9
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the contract, 20 against liens, 1 unless the bond is
also conditioned for the pa.yment of laborers and
materialmen2 • • • ' '
'' §98. -Bond Conditioned to Indemnify Owner.-N o right of action exists in favor of a materialman or laborer against the surety on a private
contractor's bond conditioned merely to indemnify
and save harmless the owner from any pecuniary
loss resulting from the breach of any of the terms
of the contract between the contractor and the
owner, since such bond is not intended for the
benefit or protection of the third parties, but
merely to indemnify the owner. 5 • • • "
"§99. -Effect of Statutes.-... Furthermore,
a contractor's bond which does not contain the
condition specified by a statute authorizing such
bond for the payment of laborers and materialmen but expressly provides that the surety shall
not be liable to anyone other than the owner, is
not a statutory one, but is intended for the sole
protection of the owner, and hence a laborer or
rna terialman · cannot recover thereon against the
surety. 12 ' '
In addition to the text statements above set forth,
this matter has been twice annotated in the American
Law Reports. Pertinent extracts from 77 A.L.R. 21 at
page 32 are as follows:

''II. Introduction and general principles"b. Intention, :Motive, or purpose of parties
direct or incidental benefit.
'' ... And it has been stated that, where the
bond is designed solely for the benefit. of the

10
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formal parties thereto, laborers and materialmen
cannot sue thereon, even though they might derive
some incidental, consequential, or remote benefit
from its enforcement . . . Montgomery v. Rief
( 1897), 15 Utah 495, 50 Pac. 623 ; ... '' 77 A.L.R.
21, 32.
"III. Bond of Private Contractor''b. Terms of bond., 1. In general . . . As
stated by the court in Knight & J. Co. v. Castle
(1909), 172 Ind. 97, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 573, 87 N.E.
976, the obligation of the surety to laborers and
materialmen must arise from the written agreement or not at all, and 'even in case of an intention that the promise shall be for the benefit of
a third person, it must still be in writing'." 77
A.L.R. 21, 55, 56.
"5. Conditioned to Indemnify Owner, (a) In
general. No right of action exists in favor of a
materialman or laborer against the surety on a
private contractor's bond conditioned merely to
indemnify and save harmless the owner from any
pecuniary loss resulting from the breach of any
of the terms of the contract between the contractor and the owner, since such bond is not intended
for the benefit or protection of the third parties,
but merely to indemnify the owner. Pine Bluff
Lodge of Elks v. Sanders (1908), 86 Ark. 291,
111 s.w. 255.
"And in Skinner Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Shevlin Engineering Co. (1931), 231 App. Div. 656, 248 N.Y.
Supp. 380, it was held that a materialman could
not recover against the surety on a contractor's
bond to the owner, conditioned merely to hold the
latter harmless in relation to any money that
11
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might be due the materialman from the contractor
and from any expense incurred in litigation in
connection therewith.
''And a bond conditioned for the benefit and
indemnification of the owner and persons advancing money to pay for labor and materials, and
authorizing such persons to sue thereon, was held
not to inure to the benefit of one furnishing materials, rather than advancing money, to the contractor. Maca.tee v. Hamilton (1896), 15 Tex. Civ.
App. 108, 38 S.W. 530, ...11 , 77 A.L.R. 21, 65.
The pertinent extracts from the supplemental annotation in 118 A.L.R. 68 are as follows :

''III. Bond of a Private Contractor.

* * *
"4. Conditioned to perform contract. (Supplementing annotation in 77 A.L.R. 65.)
"A laborer or materialman cannot recover on
a contractor's bond conditioned merely for the
faithful performance of the contract. Southwestern Dredging Corp. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.
(1934), 168 Okla. 217, 32 P. (2d) 274. See also
Fleck-Atlantic Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. (1937)
326 Pa. 15, 191 A. 51.
"A common-law bond executed by a construction contractor, conditioned merely for the faithful performance of the work contracted to be performed, does not inure to the benefit of laborers
and materialmen so as to enable them to sue thereon. Crane Co. v·. Barwick Trenching Corp. (1934),
138 Cal. App. 319, 32 P. (2d) 387.

'' 5. C onditioncd to Indemnify Ou·ner. (a) In
General.
12
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"No later decisions herein. For earlier cases,
see annotation in 77 A.L.R. 65. '' 118 A.L.R. 57,
p. 68.
It is interesting to note that there is not one case
cited in the annotations wherein a materialman or
laborer obtained against a bonding company or surety
unless words unqualifiedly requiring payment were involved.
The case law in the State of Utah as established by
this court is fully in accord with the majority opinion in
the United States as expressed in text statements and
annotations above set forth. This court's unanimous
decision in the recent case of De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin,
et al., 116 Utah 144, 208 P. (2d) 1127 stated as follows:
" ... Furthermore, the language of Mr. Justice
Thurman in M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American
Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998, 1000, in referring to these cases, is here applicable:

'It is not necessary to review the former
decisions of the court referred to by counsel. If
they are not in harmony with the last expression
of the court [Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free, et al., 46
Utah 233, 148 P. 427] they are by implication
overruled.'
''In the Blyth-Fargo Co. case, cited by appellant, the materialman was denied recovery because
the bond was construed as an undertaking to
assure performance of certain provisions of the
contract which did not include that covering payment of materialmen. The whole tenor of the opinion in that case leads to the conclusion that had
not the limiting clauses been incorporated in the
13
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bond a contrary result would- have been reached ... " 116 Utah 144, 152.
Key words in the case of Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free,
et al., 46 Utah 233, 148 Pac. 427, where the action was
determined in favor of the bonding company and against
the materialman, are the words indemnify and save
harmless.
"Now the condition of this obligation is such
that if the said Free & Taylor, a co-partnership,
shall well and truly keep and perform the terms
and conditions of the said contract as recited
herein, on its part to be kept and performed arnd
shall indemnify and save harmless the said Snake
Creek Mining & Tunnel Company ... " 46 Utah
233 at 237.
'' . . . it must appear from the terms of the
contract, or, as in this case, from the bond, that
its provisions were intended directly for the
benefit of the person who is bringing the action,
or that he belongs to a class which was intended
to be directly benefited ... " 46 Utah 233 at 242,
243.
The court thereafter cites many cases where either
the bond or the contract contained wording requiring
payment of materialmen. And, thereafter, in summation
of an extensive review of cases, states:
"It will be observed that in each and every
one of the cases reviewed there are apt and clear
expressions from which it is apparent that the
parties to the contracts and bonds intended them
for the benefit of those who should either perform
labor on or furnish materials for the building or
14
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structure which the contractor agreed to erect
or construct ... '' 46 Utah 233, 244.
" ... If therefore the contracts provided for
the payment of labor and material in general
terms, as is the fact in nearly ·an, if not all, of
the cases referred to, then it could well be assumed
that the parties to those contracts and bonds must
have intended them to be construed so as to cover
all of the provisions contained in the contracts
although not incorporated into the bonds. In the
case at bar, however, the only provision that was
contained in the contract that the contractor shall
pay 'materialmen, laborers and other employees'
is scrupulous excluded from the bond . . . '' 46
Utah 233, 245.
It seems apt to note here that the case at bar is
actually stronger than the Blyth-Fargo case, supra, insofar as the position of the bonding company is concerned,
for in the present case neither the contract nor the bond
contain provisions requiring payment of materialmen.
At a later point in the Blyth-Fargo Co. case, the court
states:
"While there may be general expressions,
which, if construed or considered alone, might be
given a wider scope or effect, yet when considered
in connection with the express restrictions and
limitations there is nothing contained in the bond
which would not be proper to insert therein if
given merely to indemnify against loss or damage
which might be sustained by a particular corporation. This being so, we have no right to extend
the scope and effect of the bond beyond what the
parties hereto, from the language used by them,
must have intended it should have ... " 46 Utah
233 at 245, 246.
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